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Abstract. Norms describe the permissions, prohibitions and obligations of 
agents in multi-agent systems in order to regulate their behavior. In this paper 
we propose a normative modeling language that makes possible the modeling 
of norms motivating the modeling of such norms together with the non-
normative part of the system. In addition, we also propose a mechanism to 
validate the norms at design time, i.e., to check if the norms respect the 
constraints defined by the language and also their possible conflicts.  
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1 Introduction 
Norms are used to regulate the behavior of the agents in open multi-agent systems 
(MAS) by describing their permissions, prohibitions and obligations. The definition 
of norms is an important part of the specification of a system and should be treated as 
an important task of MAS design. Methodologies such as Gaia [29][29], MaSE [5], 
SODA [20] and PASSI [3] [10] propose the specification of organization rules (or 
norms) during the analysis phase and recognize the need to associate these rules with 
design elements. However, there are still few modeling languages that support the 
modeling of norms together with the modeling of the entities that compose a MAS.  
It is important to consider norms while designing a MAS since:  
(i) Norms refer to actions, agents and roles that compose a system. They specify 
the actions that agents playing roles in the system are obliged, permitted or prohibited 
to execute. Therefore, redesigning the system, for instance, by excluding a role, may 
affect the norms. On the other hand, the definition of a new norm will only be 
possible if the actions, agents and roles being mentioned in the norm are being 
considered in the system design. 
(ii) Norms’ conflicts can cause the redesign of a system. Two norms are in conflict, 
for instance, if one gives a permission and another a prohibition to an agent to execute 
the same action in the same time frame. When it occurs, it is necessary to rewrite one 
of the norms in order to eliminate the conflict. While rewriting the norm, it may be 
desired, or even necessary, to redesign the system. 
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The two main goals of this paper are: (i) to support norm modeling during the 
design phase of a MAS and (ii) to define a technique to check possible conflicts 
between two defined norms at design time. We propose a normative modeling 
language, called NormML, that can be used during the design phase of a MAS to 
model the corresponding norms and an invariant-based technique to check for well-
formedness of the norms and conflicts between two norms. Such invariants are 
defined over the metamodel of NormML.  
The novelty of our approach is twofold: first, the modeling language itself, to 
model norms and second a validation technique that, when supported by a tool 
(Section 3.3), can automatically check conflicts between norms at design-time. None 
of the proposed methodologies or modeling languages for MAS is able to represent 
the three norm kinds (permission, obligation and prohibition) and to check their 
conflicts.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background material 
and Section 3 introduces our normative modeling language and tool used to 
automatically check for conflicts and query the norms model. In Section 4 we present 
related work. Section 5 concludes the paper with final remarks and discusses future 
work. 
2 Background 
NormML is a modeling language to specify norms that constraint the behavior of 
agents in MAS. Our modeling language was designed with the perception that norm 
specification in MAS design and security policy specification in role-based access 
control (RBAC) [10] design are closely coupled issues. RBAC security policies 
specify the permissions that a user has under a given role, while trying to access 
system resources. In MAS we specify the norms that regulate the behavior (or 
actions) of an agent playing a given role.  
In this section we briefly provide background material for the rest of this paper. In 
Section 2.1 we introduce the necessary norm-related terminology that will be used 
throughout the paper. Section 2.2 introduces basic notions of models and metamodels, 
necessary to understand the design of NormML. In Section 2.3 we introduce Secure 
UML [1], a UML-based [18] modeling language for RBAC, which we extend with 
normative-related concepts. Such an extension gives rise to NormML. 
2.1 Norms 
A norm can be used to regulate the interaction between two agents—those norms are 
called dialogical norms [10]—and to regulate the access to resources, the entering and 
leaving of agents in organizations and environments, and the permissions to play 
roles. 
A norm describes an action that is being permitted, obligated or prohibited, the 
entity whose behavior is being regulated (an agent, a role or an agent playing a given 
role) and a set of conditions to activate and deactivate the norm. 
2
2.2 Models and metamodels 
A modeling language provides a vocabulary (concepts and relations) for creating 
models. Such vocabulary is described by the metamodel of the modeling language 
which elements formalize the language concepts and their relationships. A metamodel 
may include invariants that specify additional properties that the models must fulfill 
as instances of the metamodel. Such invariants may specify the well-formedness 
conditions of a model with respect to its metamodel and the consistency conditions 
between metamodel concepts.   
When UML is chosen as metalanguage, a metamodel is represented by a class 
diagram and its invariants are written in OCL (Object Constraint Language) [17]. This 
is the choice followed in this paper. 
2.3 Secure UML 
Secure UML provides a language for modelling Roles, Permissions, Actions, 
Resources, and Authorization Constraints, along with the relationships between 
permissions and roles, actions and permissions, resources and actions, and constraints 
and permissions. The actions described in the language can be either Atomic or 
Composite. The atomic actions are intended to map directly onto actual operations of 
the modeled system (delete, update, read, create and execute). The composite actions 
are used to hierarchically group atomic ones.  
SecureUML leaves open what the protected resources are and which actions they 
offer to clients. ComponentUML [1] is a simple language for modeling component-
based systems that provides provides a subset of UML class models: entities can be 
related by associations and may have attributes and methods. Therefore, Entity, 
Attribute, Method, Association and AssociationEnd are the possible protected 
resources. Figure 1 illustrates the metamodel of SecureUML+ComponentUML†. By 
using such SecureUML+ComponentUML‡ it is possible, for instance, to specify the 
permissions a user playing a given role must have to execute a method (or to update 
an attribute) of a resource. In order to do so, it is necessary to instantiate the 
metaclasses User, Role, Permission, ActionExecute, Method (or ActionUpdate) and 
Attribute.  
3 NormML: A Normative Modeling Language 
NormML is a UML-based modeling language for the specification of norms in MAS. 
The choice for UML as metalanguage allows for an easy integration of NormML with 
UML-based MAS modeling languages such as AUML[19], AML[4] and MAS-
                                                          
†
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metamodel) is available at http://www.ic.uff.br/~viviane.silva/normML/secureUML.pdf 
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ML[25]. Moreover, metamodel-based validation techniques may be applied to norms 
specified in NormML.  
 
Figure 1. SecureUML+ComponenteUML metamodel 
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As mentioned in Section 2, NormML extends SecureUML modeling language. The 
NormML metamodel extends the SecureUML metamodel with the following basic 
elements: Norm, Agent and AgentAction. The NormML metamodel also includes a set 
of invariants that guarantees the well-formedness of a norm and several operations 
that are used to identify conflicts between two given norms. 
3.1 The NormML Metamodel 
The NormML metamodel extends the Secure UML metamodel in order to view norms 
as security policies, as mentioned in Section 2. While in Secure UML it is possible to 
define permissions a user has, i.e., the constraints that a user, in a given role, must 
fulfill to perform actions over the system resources, in NormML is possible to define 
the norms (obligations, permissions or prohibitions) an entity must obey, i.e., it is 
possible to describe the set of actions an agent, a role or an agent playing a role is 
obliged, permitted or prohibited to execute, conditioned by the execution of other 
actions. Figure 2 presents the NormML metamodel. (Some of SecureUML metaclasses 
are not presented for readability purposes.) A norm corresponds to an instance of the 
NormML metamodel, i.e., it is defined by instantiating several metaclasses and their 
relationships from the NormML metamodel. A norm may be either a permission (by 
instantiating the metaclass NormPermission), a prohibition (by instantiating the 
metaclass NormProhibition) or an obligation (by instantiating the metaclass 
NormObligation).  
A norm may constraint the behavior of Agents by restricting the behavior of any 
given agent playing a given Role, or by restricting the behavior of a specific agent 
while playing a role. This is captured by the Agent<->Role relationship.  
NormML inherits four resource kinds from SecureUML: Attribute, Method, Entity 
and AssociationEnd. It extends the set of resources with agent’s actions and roles’ 
actions represented by the metaclass AgentAction. Thus, it is possible to describe 
norms to control the access to attributes, methods, objects and association ends, and 
also to control the execution of the actions of agents and roles. 
Each resource kind has a set of actions that can be used to control access to a 
resource. For instance, attributes are associated with the actions read, update and full 
access (read+update). In the case of actions of agents and roles (AgentAction 
metaclass), the behavior that applies to it is the execution of the action. 
Furthermore, NormML allows for the specification of the time period that a norm is 
active, which is represented by the metaclass NormConstraint. If a norm is 
conditioned by a Before clause, it means that the norm is active before the execution 
of the action(s) described in the Before clause. If a norm is conditioned by an After 
clause, it means that the norm is active only after the execution of the action(s) 
described in the After clause. In the case of a Between clause, the norm is only active 
during the period delimited by two groups of actions. 
In order to illustrate the use of NormML to model the norms of a MAS, consider 
norms N1, N2 and N3 in Table 1. Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrates the norm 
diagrams of N1, N2 and N3, respectively. 
 
N1: Seller is obliged to give the good to the buyer after the given buyer paid for it. 
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N2: Seller is permitted to update the price of a good before a buyer pays for it. 
N3: Buyer is prohibited to return a good he/she has bought. 
Table 1 - Norm example 
 
Figure 2. NormML metamodel 
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 Figure 3. Norm N1 described by using NormML 
 
Figure 4. Norm N2 described by using NormML 
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 Figure 5. Norm N3 described by using NormML 
3.2 Validating the Norms 
The process of validating a norm encompasses two steps. First, the norm, as an 
instance of the NormML metamodel, is checked according to the invariants of the 
metamodel. The invariants check if the norm is well-formed according to the 
metamodel specification. The second step checks if any given two norms are in 
conflict. 
Well-formed norms 
Not all the norms that can be instantiated from the metamodel are well-formed. 
Examples of well-formed rules of the NormML metamodel are§:  
WFR1: The resource AgentAction can only be linked with the atomic action called 
AtomicExecute. Any other atomic action does not apply to AgentAction. 
context AgentAction 
inv: AgentAction.allInstances-> forAll(aa|aa.action-> 
    select(a|not(a.oclIsTypeOf(AtomicExecution)))->isEmpty()) 
WFR2: The resource AgentAction cannot be constrained by Permission. Although 
the metaclass Permission is defined in the Secure UML metamodel to define the 
permissions a user has over resources, the resource AgentAction can only be used by 
Norms to restrict the actions of an agent. 
context Permission 
inv: Permission.allInstances->forAll(p|p.accesses-> 
   select(a|a.resource.oclIsTypeOf(AgentAction))–>isEmpty()) 
WFR3: A norm that regulates the execution of a given action cannot be 
conditioned by the execution of the same action by the same agent. An agent cannot 
be obliged, permitted or prohibited to execute an action conditioned to the execution 
of such action. This rule uses four operations in order to guarantee that the action 
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            union(self.GetAgentExecutedActionInAfterConstraint)->  
            union(self.GetAgentExecutedActionInBetweenConstraint)-> 
            excludes(self.GetAgentExecutedActionRestrictedByNorm) 
Checking for Conflicts 
After verifying the well-formedness of the norms, it is important to check if there are 
conflicts between the norms. Two norms are in conflict, or are incompatible, if: 
1. One states a permission and another one a prohibition to execute the same action 
and such norms are active during the same period of time or during periods of time 
that intersects. The conflict occurs because the agent is permitted and prohibited to 
execute an action at the same time. Example: 
N3a: Buyer is prohibited to return a good it has bought. 
N3b: Buyer is permitted to return a good it has bought before using it. 
The activation time of N3a and N3b intersects since N3a states an unlimited 
prohibition. Thus, these norms are in conflict. 
2. One norm states an obligation and another one a prohibition over the same 
action and such norms are active during the same period of time or during periods of 
time that intersect. The conflict occurs because the agent is obliged and prohibited to 
execute an action at the same time. Example: 
N1a: Seller is obliged to give the good to buyer after the given buyer paid for it. 
N1b: Seller is prohibited to give the good to buyer before the latter pays for it. 
The activation time of N1a and N1b do not intersect. These norms are not in 
conflict since the seller is not being obliged and prohibited to execute the same 
action during the same period of time.  
3. One norm states a permission and another one an obligation over the same 
action and such norms are not active during the same period of time. A conflict may 
occur if an agent is obliged to execute an action that it is not permitted to. Example: 
N2a: Seller is permitted to update the price of a good before a buyer pays for it. 
N2b: Seller is obliged to update the price of a good after a buyer pays for it. 
The activation time of N2a and N2b do not intersect, thus these norms are in 
conflict. 
In addition, we also consider that a conflict can be caused due to the relationship 
between an agent and the roles it is playing.  
o A norm applied to a role and another one applied to an agent may be in 
conflict: A norm applied to a role restricts the behavior of all agents playing such 
role. Therefore, when searching for conflicts, it is important to check the 
incompatible norms that are applied to roles and also the ones applied to agents that 
are able to play such roles. Note that agents can play several roles. 
o A norm applied to a role and another one applied to an agent playing the role 
may be in conflict: Since the norm applied to a role regulates the behavior of all 
agents applying such role, when searching for conflicts, it is important to check the 
incompatible norms that are applied to roles and to agents playing roles. 
o A norm applied to an agent and another one applied to the agent playing a 
role may be in conflict: Since both norms will regulate the behavior of the same 
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agent, when searching for conflicts it is important to check the incompatible norms 
that are applied to agents and to agents playing roles. 
Note that two norms applied to different roles are never in conflict even though the 
same agent can play both roles. Although an agent can play more than one role at the 
same time, an action is always executed in the context of one role. We understand that 
an agent must be able to obey each norm separately while playing the roles.  
The operation CheckConflict illustrated below should be used to check conflicts 
between two norms. First, it checks if the norms are the same and, it they are not, if 
they apply to the same or related entities (as described above). Then, three important 
auxiliary operations** are used to check conflicts between an obligation and a 
prohibition, between an obligation and a permission and between a permission and an 
obligation. 
context :: CheckConflict(norm1,norm2) : String 
body if ( (norm1<>norm2) 
then(  
 if (CheckSameOrRelatedEntities(norm1,norm2) 
 then( 
  if (CheckConflictObligationProhibition(norm1, norm2) =“conflict” OR                         
      CheckConflictObligationPermission (norm1, norm2) =“conflict” OR 
      CheckConflictPermissionObligation (norm1, norm2) =  “conflict”) 
  then (“conflict”) 
  else( 
   if (CheckConflictObligationProhibition(norm1,norm2) = “conflictFree” AND 
       CheckConflictObligationPermission(norm1,norm2) = “conflictFree” AND 
      CheckConflictPermissionObligation (norm1, norm2) = “conflictFree”) 
    then( “conflictFree”) 
    else (“cannotBeVerified”) 
  )) 
 else (“conflictFree”)) 
else (“sameNorm”) 
In order to exemplify one of the three auxiliary operations, let’s focus on the 
CheckConflictObligationPermission operation, since it is frequently forgotten by 
other authors. First, this operation checks if it is dealing with a permission and an 
obligation and if both norms regulate the same actions (case 0 in operation 
CheckConflictObligationPermission). Second, it checks if the permission is not 
conditioned to any situation (case 1). In such case, there is not a conflict because the 
entity is always permitted to execute the action it is being obliged. 
Then, it checks if the norms are constrained to the same set of constraints, i.e., if 
the actions that activate and deactivate the norms are the same (case 2). If it is the 
case that both norms are constrained by a Before clause, then there is not a conflict 
since the entity is being obligated to execute an action while it is permitted to. Cases 
2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 in operation CheckConflictObligationPermission are similar. 
However, if the obligation is conditioned by a Between clause and the permission to a 
Before or an After (cases 2.5 and 2.6) it is not possible to conclude during design time 
if these norms are in conflict. It will depend on the sequence of the executions of the 
actions that will activate the norms. On the other hand, if the permission is being 
constrained to a Between condition and the obligation by a Before or an After (cases 
                                                          
**
 The implementation of such operations can be found in 
http://maude.sip.ucm.es/~viviane/normML.txt 
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2.7 and 2.8), both norms are in conflicts since the entity is being obliged to execute an 
action without permission. 
If the norms are not conditioned by the same set of conditions, then it is only 
possible to affirm that they are in conflict (i) in the case one of the norms is 
conditioned to an After†† and the other to a Before‡‡ (cases 3.1 and 3.2) and (ii) in the 
case the permission is conditioned to a Between and the obligation to a Before (case 
3,3). In both cases the agent is being obliged to execute a norm that it is not permitted 
to. 
context :: CheckConflictObligationPermission(norm1,norm2) : String 
body  
if ((norm1.oclIsTypeOf(NormObligation) and norm2.oclIsTypeOf(NormPermission))   
    or (norm1.oclIsTypeOf(NormPermission) and norm2.oclIsTypeOf(NormObligation))) 
then ( **case 0,check if norms applies to same action** 
 if (norm1.accesses=norm2.accesses 
 then (  **case 1** 
   if ((norm1.oclIsTypeOf(NormPermission) and   
        norm1.ActionsInConstraintOfNorm()->isEmpty()() ) or          
       (norm2.oclIsTypeOf(NormPermission) and   
        norm2.ActionsInConstraintOfNorm()->isEmpty()())) 
   then ( “conflictFree” )  
   else ( **case 2** 
     if (CheckSameSetOfConstraint(norm1,norm2) 
     then ( **case 2.1** 
       if (CheckBeforeBeforeNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
       then ( “conflicFree”) 
       else ( **case 2.2** 
         if (CheckAfterAftertNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
         then ( “conflictFree” )  
         else ( **case 2.3** 
           if (CheckBetweenBetweentNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
           then ( “conflictFree” )  
           else ( **case 2.4** 
             if (CheckAfterBeforeAfterBeforeNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
             then ( “conflictFree” )  
             else ( **case 2.5** 
               if(CheckBetweenObligationBeforePermissionNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
               then ( “cannotBeVerified” )  
               else ( **case 2.6** 
                 if (CheckBetweenObligationAfterPermissionNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
                 then ( “cannotBeVerified” )  
                 else ( **case 2.7** 
                   if (CheckBetweenPermissionBeforeObligation(norm1,norm2)) 
                   then ( “conflict” )  
                   else ( **case 2.8** 
                     if (CheckBetweenPermissionAfterObligationNorms 
                                                                   (norm1,norm2)) 
                     then ( “conflict” )  
                     else ( “cannoBeVerified” ) 
       ))))))) ) 
     else ( **case 3** 
       **case 3.1** 
       if (CheckBeforePermissionAfterObligationNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
       then ( “conflict” ) 
                                                          
††
 Note that we are considering that the After condition specifies that the norm is only valid 
when all the actions identified in the condition are executed. 
‡‡
 Note that we are considering that the Before condition specifies that the norm is only valid 
while none of the actions described in such condition is executed. 
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       else  ( **case 3.2** 
         if (CheckAfterPermissionBeforeObligationNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
         then ( “conflict” ) 
         else  ( **case 3.3** 
           if (CheckBetweenPermissionBeforeObligationNorms(norm1,norm2)) 
           then ( “conflict” ) 
           else  ( “cannotBeVerified” ) 
   )))) ) 
 else ( “conflictFree”  )) 
else ( “conflictFree” ) 
3.3 The Use of MOVA to Model, Validate and Query the Norms 
MOVA (Modeling and Validation group) tool [6] was used as a modeling tool (i) to 
describe the NormML metamodel, (ii) to create the normative models, (iii) to check the 
well-formedness of the norms and their conflicts, and also (iv) to inspect the 
normative models. MOVA allows for the creation of class diagrams, the definition of 
a set of invariants and operations over such diagrams and checking if object diagrams 
respect the invariants defined in class diagrams. We used MOVA to define the 
NormML metamodel as a class diagram and to describe the well-formed rules of the 
metamodel as invariants of the class diagram. The normative models were then 
described as object diagrams and checked if they comply with these invariants. 
By using MOVA it is also possible to query the object diagram (i.e., to define 
queries over such models) that can use operations defined in the class diagram. Such 
mechanism was used not only to check the conflicts between the modeled norms by 
using the operations that investigate the possible conflicts but also to explore the 
normative models themselves. Such investigation is fundamental when dealing with 
large-scale MAS that typically define a large number of norms. After describing 
hundreds norms it is almost impossible to find out, without the helping of a tool, all 
the norms applied to a role, for instance.  
4 RELATED WORK 
In this section we briefly describe how some methodologies and modeling languages 
deal with the modeling of the system norms. In addition we also present and compare 
works that have also proposed approaches to deal with norm conflicts. 
4.1 Methodologies 
Methodologies such as MESSAGE [3], Tropos [2] and Prometheus [22] do not 
address the problem of identifying and explicitly modeling norms or organizational 
rules. However, others such as Gaia, SODA, MaSE and PASSI state the importance 
of modeling organization rules during the analysis and design phases.  
Gaia affirms that the explicit identification of such rules in the analysis phase is 
very important for the correct understanding of the characteristics that the 
organization-to-be must express and for the subsequent definition of the system 
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structure by the designer. Although they have proposed a formal language to model 
the norms, they have not described any mechanism to validate the norms in order to 
find out conflicts and to verify if the elements being referred to by the norms are 
elements being modeled.  
In [7] the authors propose the integration of organizational rules into the MaSE 
methodology by extending its analysis and design phases. The rules are modeled in 
the analysis phase, while in the design phase, the organization tasks related to the 
implementation and enforcement of those rules are described. Like Gaia, MaSE 
defines a formal language for describing norms but have not proposed how to find out 
norms’ conflicts or how to check consistency between the elements described in the 
norms and the elements being modeled. 
SODA states the need for modeling social rules as agents’ interactions in the 
analysis phase and defines social models expressive enough to model the society 
interaction rules in the design phase. However, as opposed to Gaia and MaSE, this 
methodology neither presents a guideline to define such rules nor describes in details 
the characteristics of the proposed social models. 
In the role description phase of the PASSI methodology, it is possible to introduce 
social rules (or organization rules) in the UML class diagrams used to model the 
agents, their roles and actions. The rules may be expressed in OCL or other formal, or 
semi-formal manner depending on one’s needs. The two main drawbacks of this 
approach to model norms are: (i) there is not a method to verify if the elements being 
described in the norms are modeled in the system diagrams; and (ii) they do not 
propose any mechanism to check if the norms have conflicts. 
4.2 Modeling Languages 
Both AUML and AML recognize the need for modeling norms but have not defined 
any modeling technique to describe them. AML states that roles are used to define a 
normative behavioral repertoire of entities but has not proposed the modeling of 
norms. Thus, it is not possible to point out the permissions, obligations and 
prohibitions of an agent playing a role. 
In AOR [28] the use of deontic logic to describe norms is still under investigation. 
Although it is possible to describe rights (or permissions) and prohibitions, it is still 
not possible to describe obligation. In addition, there is not any mechanism to detect 
norms conflicts, even though it is possible to describe them. 
MAS-ML originally proposed the modeling of duties (or obligations) and rights as 
actions associated with roles. However, it is not possible to model more complex 
norms such as the ones conditioned to an event or to check their conflicts. 
4.3 Other Approaches that deal with Norm Conflicts 
There are several works that introduce approaches to check conflicts between norms 
and to solve such conflicts [9][13][21][23][26]. Since we have not presented any 
suggestion to the resolution of conflicts, we compare our approach with the ones that 
can find out the conflicts.  
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In [23] the authors identify three forms of conflict/inconsistency called total-total, 
total-partial and intersection. The approach we propose to validate the set of norms 
and detect conflicts can capture these three forms of conflict/inconsistency. In [9] 
several aspects of some types of conflicts and the problems they arise are discussed. 
In particular, the authors discuss the difference between deontic inconsistencies, 
which occur when actions are simultaneously prohibited and permitted, and deontic 
conflicts, which occur when actions are simultaneously prohibited and obliged. In our 
approach we present solutions to deal with these two types of conflicts. 
The model presented in [14], called NoA, is able to detect conflicts between norms 
at runtime and propose resolutions to those conflicts. They state that by allowing 
conflicts it has partial benefits in the engineering of multi-agent systems. Thus, the 
main difference between their approach and ours is that our mechanism must be used 
to check norms at design time. In our point of view, at least the norms defined by the 
design must be conflict-free before the execution of the system.  
Differently from us, in [12] the authors present an approach to detect conflict based 
on the time a norm is activated. In our approach we have not associated a norm with 
an activation time but with the execution of a set of actions that activates the norm. In 
[26] the authors present an approach to detect conflicts between related norms, i.e., 
norms applied to the same agent/role, restricting the same actions and whose 
activation periods overlap. The mechanism used to detect conflicts proposed in our 
paper is based on the approach presented in [26]. We extend such approach to 
consider conflicts between norms that state permissions and obligations—the authors 
in [26] only consider permissions and prohibitions or obligations and prohibitions—
and to deal with activation time that is related to the execution of actions—the 
activation time proposed in [26] is related to values associated with attributes. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented NormML, a normative modeling language that builds on role-based 
access control concepts. By using NormML it is possible to identify roles, agents and 
actions of a system while modeling its norms. Since NormML is based on UML, the 
integration of such language with any multi-agent system modeling language also 
based in UML, such as AUML, AML and MAS-ML, is facilitated. The roles, agents 
and actions identified while modeling the norms must be modeled in the agent-
oriented models provided by such modeling languages. 
We have defined a set of invariants and operations that makes possible the 
validation of the norms by verifying their well-formedness and by checking the 
possible conflicts between norms. We have defined three main operations to detect 
conflicts between an obligation and a permission, an obligation and a prohibition, and 
a permission and a prohibition. 
We are in the process of extending the language to describe temporal restrictions 
and also sanctions. In order to be able to define the NormML metamodel, we have 
based such definition in the normative grammar proposed in  [24]. This grammar 
extends the normative language proposed by Garcia-Camino et al. [10] with the 
notion of non-dialogical actions proposed by Vazquez-Salceda et al. [27] and with the 
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definition of sanctions and relationships between norms stated by Lopez y Lopez et 
al. in [11][16]. However, the current version of NormML does not contemplate the 
definition of sanctions or temporal conditions.  
It is also our intension to define a sequence diagram for NormML to describe the 
sequence of the executed actions. By using such diagram it will be possible to check 
conflicts that depend on the sequence of the executed actions (as mentioned in Section 
3.2) and it will also be possible to identify the norms that are active and the ones that 
were violated. 
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